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I. C. J. DAMAGES: TORT REMEDY FOR FAILURE
TO PUNISH OR EXTRADITE INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISTS
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On December 18, 1973, Arab terrorists killed thirty-two people in Rome's Leonardo Da Vinci Airport during an attack on a
United States airliner. Hostages were taken to Athens in support
of a demand for the release of two Palestinian terrorists being held
in Greece.1 The aircraft was granted free passage to the Middle
East Sheikdom of Kuwait, where local authorities indicated that
there were no plans to try the hijackers.2 A scramble for jurisdiction resulted, 8 but no one has faced trial for this tragedy.4
* B.A., University of Pittsburgh; J.D., California Western School of Law;
LL.M. Candidate, Columbia University.
The views expressed are solely those of the writer and are not to be construed
as representing the position of any other person or agency.
1. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
2. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
3. Egypt's President Sadat and Jordan's King Hussein condemned the attack. N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1973, at 18, col. 5. The United States demanded
that the perpetrators be tried or extradited so that justice would be done. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 20, 1973, at 1, col. 2. Furthermore, a Palestinian guerilla organization negotiated with Kuwait for custody of the hijackers. N.Y. Times, Dec. 23,
1973, at 1, col. 4.
4. Id., at 6, col. 1. It was probable that this was the same group that
killed twenty-seven, and wounded eighty others at Tel Aviv's Lydda Airport in
1972. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1973, at 18, col. 5. Although many Arab terrorists responsible for hijackings, kidnappings, seizure and execution of hostages during 1973 surrendered or were captured, few received meaningful punishment. For
example, on Sept. 5, 1973, two of five terrorists who plotted to shoot down an Israeli plane were released on their own recognizance and absent for trial before
an Italian Court; July 24, 1973, five terrorists hijacked a Japanese 747 in flight
from Amsterdam to Tokyo, then blew it up in Tripoli, Libya. None of the Japanese and Arab pirates were brought to trial. On April 9, 1973, eight Arab terrorists attacked an Israeli plane at Nicosia, Cyprus and were sentenced to seven years
imprisonment. President Makarios quietly released them, indicating the hope that
Cyprus would not become a battleground for Middle East conflicts. April 4, 1973,
two Arabs unsuccessfully attacked Israeli passengers at the Rome airport. Although arrested, they were released and sent to Lebanon. See generally N.Y.
Times, Dec. 20, 1973, § C, at 16, cols. 5-8. Further 1973 incidents of international terrorism included the murder of an Arab diplomat in Rome, maiming of
a New York postal employee by letter-bomb from Malaysia, and aircraft hijackings or attempts in Turkey, Mexico, and Japan. See U.S. Votes Against U.N.
General Assembly Resolution Calling for Study of Terrorism, U.S. U.N. Press
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Terrorism will not be eradicated in advance of the solution
of its major causes. Arab terrorists did not consider these airport
travelers "innocent" since they did not share the same personal concern with Middle East problems. The hijackers relied upon the
political motivation defense5 as a premise of legitimacy for what
the majority of nations consider criminal terrorism. Although
there have been attempts to deal with the potential6 causes of terrorism, -an interim remedy for the injured must be implemented.
One proposed solution has been a World Criminal Court. Although -this proposal is confronted with national sovereignty objections, this author recognizes its theoretical utility. Multilaterally
defined "terrorism" could constitute a test case for its jurisdiction.
Before this is feasible, an interim civil remedy for wrongful
death, personal injury, and property damage is necessary. If a
State fails to effectively punish or extradite international terrorists, it should be liable for damages in the International Court
of Justice (I.C.J.). Adoption of such an international tort theory
will not solve the problem, but will be one step closer toward mitigating the effects.
This remedy cannot be implemented until -the scope of "international terrorism" has been multilaterally defined.
I.

A.

SCOPE OF THE CONTROVERSY

FadingDefinitional Conflicts?

The United Nations General Assembly rccently adopted a resolution intended to control international terrorism. 7 However,
there was lack of precision in defining terrorism, which narrowed
the resolution's effectiveness as a means toward ending the global
exportation of terror and violence. 8 This imprecision is evidence
Release No. 163, 68 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 81, 82 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as U.S. Veto].
5. For a detailed definition of the political motivation defense beyond the
scope of this Article, see Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses Exception in Extradition-A Proposed Juridical Standard for an
Unruly Problem, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 217 [hereinafter cited as Political Offenses
Exception].
6. See, e.g., International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3068 (XXVIII) (1973), 13 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 50 (1974).

7. See Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, G.A.
Res. 3034 (XXVII, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (1973), 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
218 (1973) [hereinafter cited as RES. 3034].
8. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 28
U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
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of a national willingness to tolerate terrorism when it furthers political objectives. Therefore, the United Nations (U.N.) has both
an opportunity and obligation to assume primary responsibility to
alleviate, if not eradicate, what should be characterized as universal 9 crimes. Clandestine national support probably fosters the inclination for what the U.N. has repeatedly referred to as:
[I]nternational terrorism which endangers or takes innocent
human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and . . .
those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair, and which cause some
people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes. 10
The U.N. International Law Commission (I.L.C.) has been
charged with the task of preparing new norms to combat international" terrorism.' 2 Before the I.L.C. can submit its recomReport of the Ad Hoc Committee]. See also text accompanying notes 13-32,
infra.
9. Universal crimes considered to be within the scope of this Article include: surface piracy, air hijacking, kidnapping and murder of diplomats, and the
exportation of terrorism based upon essentially domestic or regional conflict. See
generally authorities cited in note 206, infra. As urged herein, these enumerated
acts or attempts should be punished by the captor if extradition claims are waived
by the offended State. Absent an extradition commitment, a State wherein a terrorist is found cannot punish him since international terrorism is not now subject
to universal jurisdiction. See Frank & Lockwood, Preliminary Thoughts Towards
an International Convention on Terrorism, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 83 (1974).
An important distinction would arise regarding an internal and international
crime. A United States (U.S.) citizen might murder a U.S. citizen in the U.S.
But a fanatic of Jewish extraction killing a U.S. diplomat of Arab extraction in
Washington, D.C. would constitute a universal crime within the scope intended.
Crimes not within the meaning of these limitations, in other words, not international in scope, are intended to include those crimes defined and punished in accordance with national and local statutes or rule of law. White slavery, genocide,
and war crimes have been referred to as universal crimes. However, they are not
dealt with herein. See, e.g., Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5
(Dist. Ct. Jerusalem, Israel 1961), excerpted in 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 805 (1962).
10. The implication of this particular wording is found in the following documents: Study prepared by the Secretariat in U.N. Doc. A/ 8969 (1972);
G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (1973); Letter from President
of General Assembly to Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/8993 (1973); Report
on the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp.
28, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973).
11. For a discussion of the overlap of universal and internationalcrimes for
purposes of this Article, see note 9, supra. The terms "international crime" and
"common crime against mankind" are used interchangeably herein.
12. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 8, at 34. The Ad
Hoc Committee, meeting in July and August of 1973, considered various national
draft proposals on measures for the prevention of international terrorism, finally
adopting Uruguay's proposal designed to invite Member States to ratify intema-
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mendations for General Assembly consideration, Member States
must concur upon what constitutes an internationalcrime against
mankind. A modus operandi including the use of weapons and
explosives, destruction of property, or death to bring attention to
political problems is not necessarily international in scope. The
conduct must cross a border or otherwise influence international
relations.
For example, the assassination of a national leader cannot
,be summarily labeled as a common crime against mankind if directed against a chief of state for internal political purposes. 1
This same conduct would constitute an act of international significan ce in two situations. A foreign nation could furnish the local
group with the necessary support for perpetrating the act; or, that
nation could knowingly decline to either punish or extradite the
escaped perpetrator to the offended nation. This political motivation defense is utilized when such a nation fails to recognize -that
international:
[A]cts are generally committed by "secret institutions" or
bands created precisely for the purpose of the imposition of
their will by means of terror for the advancement of certain
doctrines. Since the end does not justify the means, the use
of violence and its companion, terror, constitutes a serious
breach of [International Criminal Law]. It makes the of14
fense lose its political characteristics.
When a local government opts to achieve foreign policy objectives by quietly sanctioning liberation-group terror, that government shares responsibility for the consequences. For example, the
tional instruments relevant to this problem. The Ad Hoc Committee therefore
recommended:
mhat the International Law Commission should continue its work in
the light of the concrete recommendations received from the Ad Hoc

Committee on International Terrorism by preparing new international
norms capable of combating international terrorism, and submit them to

the General Assembly for consideration at its twenty-ninth session.
Id. The U.S. proposal, calling for a convention on the prevention and punishment
of terrorism, was thereby rejected in favor of a dilatory approach.
13. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1973, at 1, col. 8. Spain's Premiere was blown
thirty feet into the air when his car passed over a remote controlled explosive
while enroute to his place of worship. Unsatisfied leftists were blamed but not
captured. This constitutes an example of internal civil strife, not within the
meaning of international terrorism. The focus was purely internal and there was
no export of terrorism to effect change as occurred in Munich, Germany when
Arab terrorists slaughtered eleven Israeli olympic athletes in September of 1972.
14. Tran-Tam, Crimes of Terrorism and International Criminal Law, in 1
M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, at
493 (1973).
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December 1973 murder of Spain's Premier Blanco, reportedly involving only internal political dissidents,' 5 would have required the

patronage of foreign clandestine support in order to qualify as an
international or common crime against mankind.'"

A State should

be equally culpable as an accessory-after-the-fact if it permits free
entry or safe passage when theoretically subject -to international responsibility to punish or extradite terrorists. It can usually avoid
these alternatives by providing asylum for political conduct, alleg-

edly outside the scope of an international crime against mankind.
The -traditional analysis is that political criminals should not be
extradited."
Difficulties stem from the definition of the political crime in

disputes regarding asylum.' 8 Fortunately, the right or privilege of
asylum,'" is waning as a defense to punishment or extradition

where universal jurisdiction 0 is appropriate.

This appears to be

15. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
16. An international or common crime against mankind refers to:
[Florms of conduct by states and individuals which so offend the common morality of mankind that they rise to the level of international
crimes.
State enforcement of sanctions to curb acts recognized as international
crimes is fast becoming a useful tool in suppressing common crimes of
an international character, such as piracy of the sea and air....
Preface to 1 M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw, at xi (1973). Therefore, foreign governmental support in the form of supplying weapons or getting the Spanish perpetrators out of the country would
constitute an international crime.
17. Oppenheim bluntly stated, "It is due to the firm attitude of Great
Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, France, and the United States that the principle

has conquered the world." 1 L.

OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW

706 (8th ed.

Lauterpacht 1955).
18. See generally id., at 707-09 and Political Offenses Exception, supra note
5.
19. Diplomatic asylum is distinct from political asylum for terrorists. For
a discussion of the former, compare the Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case, [1950]
I.C.J. 266, 276, with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for
signature April 18, 1961, - Stat. -, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 55
AM. J. INT'L L. 1064 (1961). Regarding the concept of "right to asylum," which
can be interpreted to include the right to allow an international terrorist to enter
and remain in a State under its protection, see Oppenheim, supra note 17, at 67678. Diplomatic asylum has multiple facets, not the least of which involves power
politics. Today's ruler often grants political asylum since he may need it tomorrow, if overthrown and in need of safe haven.
20. Relevant "universal" crimes are enumerated in note 9, supra. They in
turn should give rise to the universality principle of international criminal jurisdiction, one of the five recognized jurisdictional bases for prosecution of treaty-based
extradition demands. It has been submitted that "[a] state has jurisdiction with
respect to any crime committed in whole or in part within its territory." HA-
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due to international concern with the exportation of terrorism for

political purposes.
For example, Cuba and the United States concluded a bilat-

eral extradition agreement in 1973. It provided that if a particular air or sea hijacking offense is not punishable under the laws of
the country in which -the offenders arrive, each country will be
obliged to return them to the -territory of the other party. 2 ' This
undertaking represents a significant departure from earlier views
which did not recognize hijacking as a common international
crime when motivated by political goals of the hijacker.2 2 The
option -to grant asylum was foreclosed by this agreement although

it has not been tested by either party.
Further efforts to bridge definitional conflicts as -to the char-

acterization of terrorist conduct as either a common or political
crime was evidenced by a recent Canada-United States treaty which
established a number of new extraditable offenses not previously
VARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, Jurisdiction with Respect to
AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 435 (1935). See also The Schooner Exchange

Crime, 29
v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812): "The jurisdiction of the nation within
its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." However, such jurisdiction is not absolute in international law: (1) territorialjurisdiction refers to the place where the act occurred;
(2) the nationality principle of criminal jurisdiction is a basis for an alien's
home State claiming jurisdiction although acts are committed in the host State;
(3) protective jurisdiction can be claimed, based upon the national interest harmed
by the act; (4) universal jurisdiction accompanies the perpetrator of a common
international crime wherever he is found so that jurisdiction is determined in
reference to whichever State has custody regardless of where the act occurred;
(5) the passive personality principle bases jurisdiction upon the nationality of the
injured person. See W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 558-561 (1971); see also
Bassiouni, Theories of Jurisdictionand Their Application in Extradition Law and
Practice, 5 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1974).
21. Cuba-United States Memorandum of Understanding on the Hijacking of
Aircraft and Vessels, U.S. Dep't of State Press Release No. 35 (Feb. 15, 1973),
68 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 260 (1973), 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 370
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Cuba-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding].
22. In 1971, the U.S. had over eighty bilateral extradition treaties in force,
only four of which listed hijacking as an extraditable offense. Statement by John
Stevenson, Legal Advisor Dep't of State, before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 7, 1971, 65 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 84 (1971). The 1973 "understanding" with Cuba, a nation clearly at ideological odds with the U.S., indicates that terrorist hijackings should be staunchly ingrained in international law
as international crimes, devoid of their former political character. However, four
Argentine hijackers were granted safe passage to Cuba after the October 20, 1973
seizure of an Argentinian 747. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1973, at 5, col. 4.
Argentina and Cuba do not have a similar "understanding."
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covered. 23 This treaty contains a provision never before utilized
in United States extradition treaties. The traditional political-exclusion clause is unavailable to the terrorist who kidnaps, murders, or assaults a person who is either an "internationally protected person ' 21 or a passenger aboard a commercial aircraft.25
The political motivation defense has endured elsewhere. The
Organization of American States' 1971 Convention on Terrorism
constituted the first international agreement to specify that murder
or kidnapping of State representatives would not be considered political offenses, and thereby precludes the shelter of asylum for the
perpetrators. 26 Dissension mounted when a coalition of Republics walked out of the Convention.2 7 The majority was unwilling
to accede to this coalition's demands that extradition be required
for all persons accused of "political" terrorism.28 Therefore, -the
Convention adhered to the traditional concept ,that -the State granting asylum would continue to determine the nature of the offense,
the motive, and whether or not it will result in prosecution. 2 9 Undoubtedly, inconsistent characterization of terrorist crimes as either
23. The offenses include any acts done with the intent to endanger the safety
of passangers on railways, aircraft, or any other means of transportation; piracy;
unlawful seizure of aircraft; manufacture or possession of any explosive substance
with the intent to endanger life or cause damage to property. See U.S.-Canada
Extradition Treaty, U.S. Dep't of State Press Release No. 282 (Dec. 3, 1971),
65 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 741, 743-46 (1971), 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
22 (1972) [hereinafter cited as U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty].
24. Id., art. 4, para. (2) (i). Internationally protected persons are typically
diplomats, consuls, and their staffs. For an examination of terrorism and "internationally protected persons," see Comment, Terrorist Kidnapping of Diplomatic

Personnel, 5

CORNELL INT'L

L.J. 189 (1972).

25. U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty, supra note 23, art. 4, para. (2)(ii).
The political-exclusion clause cannot be invoked when there is:
[Any unlawful seizure or exercise of control of an aircraft, by force
or violence or threat of force or violence, or by any other form of intimidation, on board such aircraft.
Id., Schedule offense 23.
26. Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the
Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International
Significance, O.A.S. Doc. No. AG/88 rev. 1 (1971), 64 U.S. DEP'T STATE
BULL. 231 (1971) [hereinafter cited as O.A.S. Convention on Terrorism].
27. Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Paraguay, are militarily-dominated leftist governments not plagued with international terrorism. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1971, at 5, col. 1.
28. Most delegations, including the United States, opted for a more restricted
approach regarding only diplomatic or foreign official kidnappings. Id.
29. Article 6 of the O.A.S. Convention on Terrorism states, "None of
the provisions of this convention shall be interpreted so as to impair the right
of asylum." See O.A.S. Convention on Terrorism, supra note 26, art. 6.
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political or common will dilute the effectiveness of the Convention
in suppressing international terrorism.8 °
Hopes of an expeditious solution, intended to transcend both
jurisdictional disputes and the differing technical meanings among
the municipal criminal laws of various nations, have been retarded
by disagreement as to the optimum breadth or narrowness of conventions, characterization of terrorist crimes as political or common, and the right to asylum. This was evident at the International Civil Aviation Organization (I.C.A.O.) eighteenth session in
1971. Notwithstanding the importance of issues of violence and
death at -the hands of aircraft -hijackers, the failure to solve even
the mere procedural issue of the proper priority of items for discussion resulted in failure of the I.C.A.O. to impose sanctions on
Member States.
This result is attributable to the attitude that questions of international security would be more properly studied by the United
Nations" combined with the realization that the U.N. has little
power, or insufficient juridical personality, .to solve this issue without the vigorous support of its powerful Members. The current
stalemate is rooted in the underdeveloped nations' focus on the reasons for terrorism while the developed nations emphasize prevention. Concerted action is therefore essential against States in default of their international obligations of extradition or prosecution."2 Although a few smaller nations -might claim that power
politics cannot mold consensus, it ,has done so -throughout -the history of mankind. Political terrorism has violated fundamental
rights of travel, privacy, and life itself. Kidnapping, murder, 'and
extortion generate -the same effect regardless of motive. In spite
30. The O.A.S. Convention on Terrorism was adopted by a vote of thirteen
(including the U.S.) to one with two abstentions and six Republics not present
for the vote due to possible characterization of the enumerated offenses as political
rather than common. See text accompanying notes 27-29, supra. Thirteen of
twenty-two possible votes composed too slender a margin to ensure continued Latin-American adherence to the traditional sovereign right to grant asylum for terrorist activities not specifically prohibited by article 2. The recent international
rash of terrorism will hopefully generate among nations the realization that a
State should also protect persons other than those to whom it has the duty to
give special protection, regardless of political motives.
31. Report and Minutes of the Legal Commission, Ass. 18th Sess., I.C.A.O.
Doc. 8954 A18-LE (1971).
32. See Fitzgerald, Concerted Action Against States Found in Default of
Their InternationalObligations in Respect of Unlawful Interference with International Civil Aviation, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 261, 276 (1972). See also id., n.52.
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of the need for agreement, the political motivation defense has
stymied U.N. measures to abort ,thesefear tactics.
B.

Initiative or Inertia

The United Nations Membership must confront the international aspects of the difficult legal and social ramifications of international terrorism. The increasing frequency of violence and
terror directed at chiefs of state, diplomats, passengers, and other
innocent civilians has created a climate of fear from which no one
is immune. 3
On September 6, 1972, following the massacre of eleven Israeli Olympic competitors by Arab terrorists in Munich, Germany,
the United States Senate and House of Representatives approved
identical resolutions urging other countries to cut off tall contacts
with nations providing sanctuary or support to terrorists. 4 United
Nations' Secretary-General Waldheim promptly asked the General
Assembly to seriously consider measures -to block the terrorist
menace.35 Several Western diplomats proposed the drafting of
an international treaty obligating governments to punish or extradite terrorists. 6 West German Minister Scheel stated that he would
propose closer cooperation among Western European countries in
combating terrorists at the next meeting of the Common Market. 37
However, some nations preferred that acts of terrorism, synonymous with patriotism, not be discussed by the U.N. As a result,
vetoes by Communist China and Russia, were factors which led to
33. Yoset Tekoah, Permanent Israeli Representative to the United Nations,
pointed out to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that "Despite requests

to it by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Egyptian Government refused to
cooperate in any steps that might have averted the Munich outrage."

Letter dated

8 Sept., 1972, from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/8784, S/10779, at 2 (1972).
This letter alleged that:
The Government of Egypt has recently called for the intensification of
Arab terror warfare and the radio stations of the terror organizations
operate from Egypt and Syria while their headquarters, bases and institutions are located in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Libya. The intelligence

services of the Arab States, and particularly those of Egypt, maintain
close ties with the terror organizations and assist them in their criminal
activities.
Id., at 1.
34. See generally N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1972, at 1, col. 7.
35. See Note by the Secretary General Regarding Measures to Prevent Terrorisms, U.N. Doc. 8791 (1972).
36. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1972, at 2, col. 4.

37. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
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the failure to include a condemnation of all acts of terrorism in
resolutions calling for a cease-fire in the Middle East.18 In spite
of this attitude, Secretary-General Waldheim declared that:
I am fully aware that the problem of terrorism and violence
is an immensely complex one to which there are no short cuts
and no easy solutions. I know that a number of Governments
will have difficulties in formulating their approach to this
39
problem.
It would have been difficult to consider this complex phenomenon without a simultaneous examination of the underlying situations giving rise to terrorism and violence throughout the world.
The United Nations has been criticized when it does act and criticized when it does not.4 0 Therefore, the General Assembly supported the proposal to at least study, but not implement, measures to prevent international terrorism.
A study was published in November of 1972 which was essentially a scholastic endeavor by the Secretariat to provide the subsequent session of the United Nations with a thorough analysis of
origins and causes of this phenomenon. 41 The consensus was that
in order:
[T]o come within the scope of the subject, the interests of
more than one State must be involved, as, for example, when
the perpetrator or the victim is a foreigner in the country
where the act is done, or the perpetrator has fled to another
42
country.
38. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
39. See Statement by the Secretary General Regarding Measures to Prevent
Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/8791/Add.l, at 2 (1972). He further stated:
I proposed this item, nevertheless, because there is deep and general concern with the phenomenon of international terrorism, because the scope
of terrorist activity as well as its underlying causes have become increasingly international, and because modem technology has added a formidable new dimension to this ancient problem.

Id.

40. Id., at 3.
41. See generally Study on measures to Prevent International Terrorism,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Study on Measures to Prevent

International Terrorism]. Chapter one deals with origins and fundamental causes
of international terrorism; chapter two relates to action taken in the field of international penal law for the prevention and punishment of terrorism.
42. Id., at 6. The requisite conduct:
[Mlust be such as to spread terror or alarm among a given population,
or among broad groups of people. The act is necessarily a conspicuously violent one, which is often intended to focus public attention and
to coerce a State into a particular action. One of the most effective
means towards that aim is to endanger, threaten or take innocent human
lives and to jeopardize fundamental freedoms.
Id. (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the emphasized wording may give rise to
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If nothing else, there is unanimous agreement that the terrorist's main purpose is -to draw attention to his cause. His immediate aim is limited to such objectives as liberation of prisoners,
general spread of terror, demonstration of the impotence of government control, or provocation of repressive measures in order to alienate public opinion. Terrorist activity typically lacks any imme43
diate possibility of achieving its proclaimed ultimate purpose.
The U.N. study on terrorism is evidence of a disagreement
as to whether given conduct violates the territorial integrity or political independence of a State, or else constitutes patriotic bravery, even though use of force in international relations is prohibited.4 4 The classic example of the sharp split over what is either
an act of the political process or an international crime was demonstrated by the debate preceeding the U.N. General Assembly's
adoption of Resolution 3034 regarding measures to prevent inter46
national terrorism.4 5 Various U.N. Legal Committee proposals
regarding measures to prevent international terrorism exposed
two conflicting theories as to the appropriate remedy: immediate
measures versus an interim study of causation. These theories
were proliferated into mutually exclusive approaches by both the
general debate and final draft measures.
The first of three distinguishing features of the proposed
draft resolutions involved the appropriate characterizationof terrorist acts. Regarding the loss of innocent human lives due to
acts of international terrorism, the United States (U.S.) "deplored"
potential definitional conflict as to whether conduct not necessarily conspicuously
violent qualifies. For example, two Britons were arrested in an aborted conspiracy to blow up an El Al Aircraft at London's Heathrow Airport. A conspiracy that fails is arguably not conspicuously violent, especially if the arresting
sovereign has some reason not to punish or extradite the latent terrorist. One
of the two conspirators was freed after turning state's evidence. See N.Y. Times,
Dec. 20, 1973, § C, at 16, col. 4.
43. See Study on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, supra note
41, at 7.
44. The United States Charter states:
[AIll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4. If the accusation of Israel regarding Egyptian,
Syrian, Lebanese, and Lybian clandestine national support for terrorist activities
is accurate, all of the latter nations have clearly violated the quoted provision.
45. See RES. 3034, supra note 7.
46. As a result of the Secretary General's placement of "measures to prevent
international terrorism" on the agenda, various national blocs coalesced in produc-

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1975

11

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1975], Art. 14
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 5

such acts,47 a Western bloc "condemned" 'them,4 8 and the African-Mideast Bloc "expressed deep concern." 4 9
The second distinguishing feature of the several drafts centered upon -the time frame for cure. The U.S. draft, with a view
toward immediate and concrete measures, envisaged "early
1973" 10 as the target date for a plenipotentiary conference to consider a convention on prevention and punishment. 5 1 The Western bloc sought an International Law Commission draft for adop'
tion by a conference of plenipotentiaries in "November 1973, 52
based upon the bloc's request for an ad hoc committee study in the
interim.5" Italy sponsored a revision to this draft by replacing the
specific target date with "'the earliest practical date."54 The African-Mideast bloc's draft recommended appropriate measures at
the national level 5 and an analytical study of causes of terrorism
by an ad hoc body.5" Both suggestions were designed to delay
ing three possible draft resolutions for adoption by the General Assembly based
upon selection of the optimum draft by the Legal (Sixth) Committee.
47. See Draft Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.851 (1972) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Draft Resolution]. See
also Report of the Sixth Committee on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, para. 9, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/8969 (1972).
48. See Draft Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism,
U.N. Doe. A/C.6/L.879 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Western Bloc Draft Resolution]. See also Report of the Sixth Committee on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, para. 10, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/8969 (1972). This bloc was composed of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Italy, Japan, and was later
joined by Austria, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, Luxemburg, Nicaragua, and United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
49. See Draft Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.880 (1972) [hereinafter cited as African-Mideast Draft Resolution]. See also Report of the Sixth Committee on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, para. 11, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/8969 (1972).
This bloc was
initially composed of Afghanistan, Algeria, Guyana, India, Kenya, Yugoslavia,
Zambia, and was later joined by Cameroon, Chad, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mali, and the Sudan.
50. U.S. Draft Resolution, supra note 47, preambular para. 2.
51. The U.S. simultaneously submitted a working paper for consideration by
the General Assembly's Legal Committee. U.S. Draft Convention for Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism Acts, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.850 (1972), 11
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1382 (1972) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Convention for
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism].
52. Western Bloc Draft Resolution, supra note 48, para. 5.
53. Id., para. 7.
54. See Revised Draft Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, U.N. Doe. A/C.6/L. 879/Rev. 1 (1972).
See also Report of the
Sixth Committee on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, para. 12
at 9, U.N. Doc. A/8969 (1972).
55. African-Mideast Draft Resolution, supra note 49, para. 6.
56. Id., para. 8.
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immediate measures. A revision to this draft, introduced by
Zambia, sought speedy elimination of international terrorism
bearing in mind the legitimacy of the struggle of national liberation movements.5 7 This was proposed to implement the AfricanMideast Bloc's rationale for cautious deliberation. Immediate
measures to prevent international terrorism might thwart liberation
group violence aimed at colonial or alien domination. This Bloc
thereby manifested its concern that multinational suppression of
transboundary murder and terror might also suppress self-determination.
The -final distinguishing feature of the draft resolutions pertained to actual measures. The U.S. preambular wording asserted
that:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in . . . terrorist acts in another
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory
directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts
Iinvolve a threat or use of force. 58
Saudi Arabia's wording, by the negative implication of its draft revision, was far narrower than the scope of the U.S. version:
[The African-Mideast Draft] requests the ad hoc Committee
to consider . . . international legal measures in respect to
those acts of terrorism motivated by personal lucrative gain
or for usurping power for strictly personal ends, whereas in
regard to terrorism emanating from repressed national aspirations, the report should include the exploration of special
measures calculated to avoid the sacrifice of innocent lives. 59
Conversely, if acts of international terrorism were motivated by
political lucrative gain, or usurpation of power for strictly political
ends, adoption of the Saudi Arabian draft by the Legal Committee
would preclude international legal sanctions. The unexplained
special measures in reference to the sacrifice of innocent lives could
only urge special efforts in and out of ,the U.N. which could not be
multilaterally implemented due to the ideological rift as to political
57. See Revised Draft Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/880/Rev. 1 (1972). See also Report of the Sixth
Committee on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, para. 13, at 9,
U.N. Doc. A/8969 (1972).
58. U.S. Draft Resolution, supra note 47, preambular para. 6.
59. Draft Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/L.895 (1972) (emphasis added). See Report of the Sixth
Committee on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, para. 14, at 10,
U.N. Doc. A/8969.(1972).
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versus common or international crimes. 6° The African nation of
Lesotho submitted amendments to the African Bloc resolution,
which the Legal Committee decided to treat as a draft resolution.
It was unique in that it urged "immediate measures" 61 against international terrorism 2 resorted to by "oppressed peoples . . .
-forced to respond by resorting -to violence and retaliatory use of
terror .... "163 The thrust of Lesotho's draft was to invite big
Powers to exert influence on racist, colonial, and foreign regimes
that suppress the legitimate rights of internal social groups. 64 This
in turn would bring attention to the alleged racism, colonialism,
and foreign domination that causes resort to violence and terrorism.
The Legal Committee adopted the sixteen-power draft resolution of the African-Mideast Bloc. 65 The nations that called upon
the U.N. for strong international legal action against terrorism suf,fered a dismal defeat. Nations supporting a stronger resolution
indicated -that they would bypass future U.N. efforts to deal with
terrorism. They considered terrorism as a subject matter of greatest international concern, requiring immediate preventative measures rather than an interim study of causation. 66 The General
Assembly subsequently adopted another resolution, incorporating
the Legal Committee's adopted draft on Measures to Prevent Ter,rorism.67 The Assembly resolution called for submission of concrete proposals, but since none were submitted,6 the established
60. See generally text accompanying notes 14-30, supra.
61. Revised Draft Resolution (Amendments) on Measures to Prevent Inter-

national Terrorism, para. 15, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/8969 (1972).
62.

Lesotho declared:

[T]he use or threat of violence by individuals, organizations in or organs of the State against the innocent citizens or persons of other States
or their property either for security, political objectives or for purposes
of extortion constitutes InternationalTerrorism; ....
Id., para. 15, at 11. This draft wording is not directed toward independent bands

of fanatics, rather to dependent pressure groups, in or of another nation, threatening foreign citizens.
63. Id., para. 15, at 12.
64.

Id.

65. Id., para. 18(b), at 14. The recorded vote was seventy-six (including
African-Mideast Bloc) to thirty-four (including Western Bloc), with sixteen abstentions (none of whom supported any of the three possible draft resolutions).
66. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1972, at 1, col. 6. These nations included
the U.S., Great Britain, Canada, Costa Rica, Australia, and Belgium.
67. See RES. 3034, supra note 7.

68. RES. 3034 "invites States to . . . submit observations to the Secretaiy
General by 10 April 1973, including concrete proposals for finding an effective
solution .. ,"
id, This author'es telephone call to the Office of the Secretary
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Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism 69 proceeded to pick
up where the General Assembly debate left off.7" The Ad Hoc
Committee again considered the definition, causes, and measures
to end international terrorism but failed to agree upon recommendations to the General Assembly.71 Greece7 2 and the United
States 73 submitted concrete proposals as to specific crimes and
punishment. However, the Committee finally adopted the Uru-

guayan draft recommending that the International Law Commission continue its work74 in light of the "concrete" recommendations received from the Ad Hoc Committee.
The General Assembly opted for delay 'by studying causation
rather than multilaterally implementing preventative measures.
The Ad Hoc Committee was unable to agree upon recommendations for the 1973-1974 General Assembly. These results were
predictable due to definitional conflicts as to when an act is politi-

cal or a common crime, and whether violence for the sake of national or regional liberation is justified.

Therefore, the United

States is at least one power that probably views the present stalemate as a:
General on April 30, 1973, revealed that no proposals were submitted. The
United States had previously submitted a draft convention prior to RES. 3034's
invitation to all nations. See U.S. Convention for Prevention and Punishment
of Terrorism, supra note 51.
69. See Letter from the President of the Twenty-Seventh Session to the Secretary General dated April 24, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/8993 (1973), establishing
committee membership.
70. See Committee on International Terrorism Continues General Debate,
U.N. Press Release GA/4475 (1973). For an unofficial summary of Committee
proceedings, see U.N. Press Releases (1973) GA/4764; GA/4767, BIO/1031;
GA/4775-4776; GA/4778-4780; GA/4784-4785; GA/4788-GA/4785; GA/4788GA/4889.
71. The concluding statement of the Terrorism Committee reads, in part:
mhe resulting frank and extensive exchange of ideas brought out the
diversity of existing views on the various aspects of the subject submitted for consideration to the Ad Hoc Committee. Those views are . . .
contained in the report, the careful consideration of which the Ad Hoc
Committee recommends to the General Assembly.
See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 8, at 20. See also U.N. Press
Release (unofficial) GA/4789 (1973).
72. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 8, at 26.
73. Id., at 28.
74. Id., at 34. The International Law Commission is presently working to
prepare new international norms capable of combating international terrorism. It
previously prepared draft articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes
against diplomatic personnel. See Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of Its Twenty-fourth Session, U.N. Doc. 8710 (1972), 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 977 (1972) [hereinafter cited as "Internationally Protected Persons" Draft Articles].
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[C]lear signal -tothe world that the United Nations as a body
has chosen to take minimal action rather than meaningful ac75
tion on this very urgent problem.

This viewpoint tends to improperly distinguish between the
U.N. as a "body" and its nation Members participating in negoti-

ations.

The Membership is not differently constituted or moti-

vated if negotiating under the aegis of the U.N. than it would be if
bargaining in a non-U.N. atmosphere. Other proposed solutions,
not under the auspices of the United Nations, have not succeeded
either. As a result, two potential remedies must be carefully considered since one of them may prevail as a result of the endeavors
of the U.N. International Law Commission.
11.

CRIMINAL

I. C. J.-JURISDICTIONAL FRICTION

Customary international law acknowledges extraterritorial
jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed outside a nation's

borders,76 on its aircraft77 and ships,7" by its nationals and aliens
in connection with the discharge of functions for the injured
75. See U.S. Veto, supra note 4, at 90.
76. See nationality, protective, and passive personality principles of international criminal jurisdiction, note 20, supra.
77. In January of 1973, the I.C.A.O.'s Legal Committee adopted a resolution
recommending that the I.C.A.0. Council take specific action with regard to the
French, Swiss-United Kingdom, Nordic, and U.S.S.R. draft amendments to the
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, done, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, T.I.A.S. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. Representative of the consensus as to the
jurisdictional strings attached to the offender, though beyond the boundary of the
State of registry, is the U.S.S.R. draft provision that:
[E]ach Contracting State undertakes to return offenders to the State of
registration of the aircraft when so requested by it, except where the
persons concerned are nationals of the State on the territory of which
the offender is present.
Draft Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, I.C.A.O. Doc. LC/Working Draft No. 826, art. 1, (1973), 12 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 377, 380 (1973). For examples of internal statutory penalties recently enacted to combat the skyjacking menace at the municipal level, see Decree
on Criminal Liability for the Hijacking of Aircraft, 25 CrJRR. DIGEST OF SOVIET
PRESS 7 (1973), 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1160 (1973) and Gesetzblatt der

Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, July 20, 1973, Issue 33, at 337-38, 12 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1158 (1973).

78. See Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A. No. 9; 2 HUDSON,
WORLD COURT REPORTS 20 (1935). A violation of Turkey's interests due to a
collision caused by a French naval vessel constituted a sufficient basis for Turkey
to prosecute the officer-of-the-deck for involuntary manslaughter when the Lotus
entered port. Therefore, a terrorist seizure of a vessel on the high seas would
provide protective, passive personality, and universal jurisdictional claims for a
multitude of possible sovereigns. See generally note 20, supra.
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State,7 9 and for acts which harm internal interests. 80

The -legal

bases for international criminal jurisdiotion are meaningless when
municipal authorities fail to assert territorial or universal jurisdiction. 81 There is concurrent jurisdiction over a terrorist who commits a crime against the interests of one State and is found in an-

other.

This gives rise to disputes as to whether the offender

must be internally punished or returned to the harmed nation.

The conflict is especially evident where a nation having custody,
or knowledge of -the presence of an international terrorist, is sympathetic to his cause but neither punishes nor extradites"2 'him.

Concurrent jurisdiction over mutually recognized criminal defendants is realistically implemented only by bilateral extradition treaties.

8

Although a world wide extradition convention would 'be ideal,
many States prefer bilateral agreements.8 4 Even this tool is ineffec-

tive since international terrorists often circulate with impunity in
nations or regions -that are sympathetic to their motives. Furthermore, ,the customary practice is to denounce extradition treaties in
anticipation of war or changes in internal law. 8 The ineffective79. See "Internationally Protected Persons" Draft Articles, supra note 74.
80. See protective principle of international criminal jurisdiction, supra note
20.
81. The classic example involves the five international terrorists who killed
thirty-two people and were granted free passage to Kuwait. They were taken into
custody upon their surrender but never tried or extradited. See text accompanying
notes 1-4, supra. Terrorism per se has not been accepted as a universal crime.
See generally offenses enumerated in authority in note 206, infra. As suggested
in note 9, supra, it is the opinion of this author that international terrorism, once
defined, should be categorized as a universal crime.

82. On extradition, see generally 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW xvi (1968); 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(1942); 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1012 (2d ed. 1945). The right to demand extradition and the correlative duty to surrender an individual to the demanding country both spring from treaty only. The United States view is
that "The principles of international law recognize no right to extradition apart
from treaty." Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
83. Concurrent criminal jurisdiction may exist although one of the nations
may be unable to obtain custody of the "accused." A number of countries have
procedures for trying persons in abstentia for offenses within the harmed nation.
This appears to constitute concurrent jurisdiction even though the nation is unable
to gain physical custody of the individual being tried. The court may have subject
matter jurisdiction over the offense without in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.
84. See I. SHEARER, ExTRADrmON IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (1971).
85. Id., at 43. Terrorist mobility is assured when a nation too weak to accomplish desired military objectives supplies covert support for such activity. This
analysis applies to Arab-Israeli terrorist organizations probable training of Irish
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ness of extradition commitments has been very influential upon
proposals for the establishment of a World Criminal Court.

6

After ,the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia at
Marseilles in 1934, the League of Nations established a Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism. 7 After several
years of drafting, a convention creating an International Criminal

Court was opened for signature.8 8

This striking innovation pro-

vided a method to relieve States of embarrassing burdens accidentally cast upon -them, as well as assuring other States due concern
for the suppression of terrorist activities beyond their own borders.
If a terrorist sought asylum in a sympathetic nation, -that nation
could avoid prosecuting him itself by binding him over to an international judiciary. 9 Jurisdiction of the court was to be optional."
Realistically, it would have been utilized only to avoid political
terrorists in communist countries and Cuban efforts to revolutionize Latin America. Clandestine support includes denying an extradition obligation in anticipation of hostilities with the nation against which terrolist activity is directed.
86. I.C.J. jurisdiction would have to be expanded to overcome, inter alia, two
procedural limitations: "1. Only States may be parties in cases before the Court."
I.C.J. STAT., art. 34, para. 1. Therefore trial of natural persons is presently impossible since they are objects of international law. "2. The States parties to
the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory
. . . the jurisdiction of the Court .... ." Id., art. 36, para. 2 (emphasis added).
Acceptance by the United States of compulsory jurisdiction under this optional
paragraph did "not apply to . . . disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of America; . . ." (emphasis indicates Connally
Amendment). See Declaration on the Part of the United States of America, 61
Stat. 1218, 15 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 452 (1946) [hereinafter cited as
Connally Amendment].
87. See Report Adopted by the Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism, app. II, L.O.N. Doc. C. 222.M.162.1937V (1937). For a brief
history of previous attempts to establish international, regional, or ad hoc criminal
courts in 1919, 1920, 1924, and 1926, see Hudson, The Proposed International
Criminal Court, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 549-51 (1938).
88. Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, L.O.N.
Doc. C.547.M.384.1937V (1937). It was signed by Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Netherlands, Rumania, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. The
court was supposed to try persons accused of offenses dealt with in the companion Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, arts. 2, 3,
"Acts of terrorism" meant
L.O.N. Doc. C.546(1).M.383(l).1937V (1937).
"criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state
of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general
public." Id., art. 1, para. 2.
89. See Hudson, supra note 87. Nations could try offenders in municipal
courts, extradite, or thrust the case upon the proposed court. Hijackers who claim
to be political refugees may embarrass the nation in which they are found since
that nation's denial of asylum may contribute accusations of betraying allies.
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embarrassment and:
It would thus seem that the restricted experiment instituted by this Convention is to be classified under the head
of international criminal procedure rather than as a commencement of a substantive international criminal law. 9 1
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of this approach was never tested.
No trials were conducted since the treaty never entered into force.
The next tangible attempt to establish a transnational criminal court materialized in the 195192 and 1953 revised draft statutes,9 3 prepared by special United Nations Committees on International Criminal Jurisdiction. Finally, the General Assembly decided to:
[D]eter consideration of an International Criminal Jurisdiction until such times as the General Assembly takes up again
the question of defining aggression and the question of a draft
94
code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind.
Furthermore, many nations, and internal guerilla groups, do not want to bear responsibility for terrorists conduct which harms all interests concerned. A World
Criminal Court would permit ideological sympathy with defectors bound over for
international trial.
90. Note similarity to Connally Amendment, supra note 86.
91. Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, 19
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 217 (C. Hurst ed. 1938).
92. See Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction,
Annex I, DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.48/4 (1951); 46 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 1 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
1951 DRAFT I.C.C. STATUTE]. The thirty-year period previous to this draft statute spawned more than a dozen similar proposals or drafts. See Wright, Proposal
for an International Criminal Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 n.2 (1952).
For
an official review of the issue of International Criminal Jurisdiction, see Historical
Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/7/Rev. 1 (1949); U.N. PUB. Sales No. 1949.V.8 (1950).
93. Subsequent to the 1951 draft, a revision was negotiated. However, as
voiced in General Assembly Debate,
[D]oubts had been raised concerning the General Assembly's right to establish an International Criminal Court. If it was agreed that those
doubts were not valid in the present case, it might be most appropriate
to say "A tribunal should be established by the General Assembly."
[1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 322, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A (1953).
The
membership of the American Bar Association was not in agreement as to the
protection of the rights of the accused. Compare Parker, An InternationalCriminal Court: The Case for Its Adoption, 38 A.B.A.J. 641 (1952) with Finch, An
International Criminal Court: The Case Against Its Adoption, 38 A.B.A.J. 644
(1952).
94. 12 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 56, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/3649
(1957). In 1968, the General Assembly again deferred consideration of "International Criminal Jurisdiction" and no further action has since been taken with respect to the draft code. See generally Secretary General's Survey of International
Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/245 (1971).
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These draft codes were not implemented and the subsequent
United Nations approach to the problem of international terrorism
has continued to be one of crisis-reaction.9 5 It is doubtful whether
such a piecemeal approach will support the foundation necessary
for a comprehensive system of solving the contemporary terrorist
dilemma. A leading scholar urges that:
Without a tribunal to give a degree of coherence and
consistency to the several international instruments, their
[potential] application by national tribunals may well fall
short of the objectives of certainty ,and impartiality. 96
This ineffectiveness recently prompted the establishment of an
organization solely dedicated to the World Criminal Court remedy,
the Foundation for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (F.E.I.C.C.). 97 This foundation cooperates with the International Criminal Law Commission98 of the World Peace
Through Law Center in a combined effort to establish this Court.
Two immediate advantages would benefit international relations if the United Nations International Law Commission would
r commend a Criminal Court approach for General Assembly consideration. Politically, such countries as the United States and Algeria could both deal with defectors who hijack their way to free95. See, e.g., RES. 3034, supra note 7, which was a direct result of the terrorist slayings at the 1972 Olympic games at Munich, Germany. See also "Internationally Protected Persons" Draft Articles, supra note 74. From 1968 to
1972, twenty-seven diplomats from eleven countries were kidnapped and three
murdered. Address by John Stevenson before Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
New York and American Society of International Law, Nov. 9, 1972, 27 REcORD
OF N.Y.C.B.A. 716 (1972), 67 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 645 (1972).
Many
national leaders similarly reacted to the Munich exportation of terror. For example, U.S. President Richard M. Nixon established a Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism. See White House Press Release, Sept. 26, 1972, 67 U.S.
DEP'T STATE BULL. 475, 476 (1972).
Results of the Committee's deliberations
were recently published in The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: A
Global Approach, 70 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 274 (1974).
96. Gross, International Terrorism and International Criminal Jurisdiction,
67 AM. J. INT'L L. 509 (1973).
97. The Foundation was established in 1970 for the purpose of sponsoring
the First International Criminal Law Conference (Racine, Wisconsin 1971), at
which the concepts of a Convention on Crimes and a World Criminal Court,
which had been submerged by the U.N., could resurface.
98. This Commission was established in 1965 as the working group of the
International Criminal Law Committee of the World Peace Through Law Center.
The collective effort of the Commission resulted in the accomplishment of advocating an international criminal forum.
See Woetzel, Acknowledgements to
WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW CENTER, TowARD A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Geneva 1970),
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dom in a manner consistent with their own policies. Binding
them over for trial in an impartial World Court would support the

strong stand of the United States in preventing aircraft hijacking, 9
while at the same time prevent Algeria from granting absolute asy-

lum to those who have defected to freedom. At least minimum
humanitarian standards would be observed in dealing with perpetrators of international crimes involving terrorism. The accused
would not face inhumane treatment that might otherwise occur if
extradited to the national authority from which he fled.
The task of drafting appropriate measures regarding international crimes and a World Criminal Court was pioneered by the
F.E.I.C.C. in conjunction with the International Criminal Law

Commission (I.C.L.C.). 1°° A model convention 101 and court statute0 2 were presented at the Ivory Coast's Abidjan World Conference on World Peace Through Law in August of 1973.13 Ratification of the Convention on International Crimes would necessitate
recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
(I.C.C.) whether or not the enumerated offenses' 0 4 constitute
crimes under national law. 10 5 The I.C.L.C. apparently drafted ar99. See, e.g., U.S. Draft Convention for Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism Acts, supra note 51; U.S.S.R. Decree on Criminal Liability for the
Hijacking of Aircraft, supra note 77.
100. Initial drafts were prepared by the International Criminal Law Commission in 1971 and 1973 as educational efforts to persuade nations to expand the
use and jurisdiction of the I.C.J. See F.E.I.C.C., REPORT ON THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw CONFERENCE (Racine, Wis. 1971); F.E.I.C.C., REPORT
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONFERENCES (Racine,
Wis. 1973).
101. F.E.I.C.C., DRAFT CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND DRAFT
STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1-3 (Wash. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as either DRAFT CRIME CONVENTION or DRAFT I.C.C. STATUTE].
102. Id., at 3-9.
103. The work and scope of this Conference is summarized by the President
of the World Peace Through Law Center in Rhyne, Internationalizationof Law
to Meet Internalization of Life, 4 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1973).
104. The Convention features twenty-two subparagraphs dealing with the
broad range of offenses giving rise to I.C.C. jurisdiction. The offenses within
the scope of this Article generally include piracy, hijacking, and kidnapping of
"internationally protected persons" and specifically:
[I]ntemational acts of terrorism, being criminal acts and intended or
calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons,
or a group of persons or the general public; ....
Acts which constitute . . . complicity in or culpable failure to prevent
the commission of any of the above offenses; ....
DRAFT CRIME CONVENTION,

supra note 101, arts. 3(i) and 4(a).

105. Id., art. 1.
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ticle 6 with a view -toward mitigating the national sovereignty objections which are currently diminishing prospects for utilizing the
I.C.C. remedy:
2. Each Party to this Convention shall be under the obligation to search for and detain persons alleged to have committed any offense to which this Convention applies.
3. Each Party . . . shall have jurisdiction to try and
punish any person for having committed any offense to
which this Convention applies.
4. Each Party . . . undertakes either to prosecute an
alleged offender of this Convention in its custody, or to extradite him, or to surrender him to an international criminal
court. 106
Sovereign objections -to expansion of the present I.C.J.'s jurisdiction to include an I.C.C. chamber, notwithstanding the statutory
flexibility of article 6, are rooted in the same political quicksand
that has retarded United Nations' efforts to control international
terrorism. There still exists the political problem of convincing
major powers to agree on a remedy which would theoretically reduce national sovereignty between a government and its
nationals or aliens-a relationship traditionally considered to be
07
within the domestic jurisdiction of each sovereign State.1
This potential conflict, rooted in multilateral reluctance to relinquish absolute authority over an international criminal, can be
best illustrated by probing some of .the foreseeable objections to
procedure and competence of an I.C.C. under the 1973 draft
statute. For example, many Third World nations'0 " adhere to
106. Id., art. 6. Furthermore, post-ratification procedure permits a Party to
give notice as to "which acts specified in this Article or any other international
agreement [whereby] it . . . will not accept such obligations." Id., art. 5. It
is foreseeable that many nations would not accede to compulsory jurisdiction of
the I.C.C. without declaring a "Connally Amendment" reservation. See Connally
Amendment, supra note 86.
107. See generally KREINDLER, DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMrTrEE OF ExPERTS ON EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT OF JUSTICE

3-5 (Wash. 1973) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT I.C.J. EXPANSION REPORT]. Previous non-terrorist related U.N. consideration of, inter alia, expanding the I.C.J.'s
jurisdiction, indicated that many representatives agreed that the Court did not
function as hoped. This was due to national reluctance to apply to the Court
due to varied systems of values and excessive attachment to national sovereignty.
See Report of the Sixth Committee on the Role of the International Court of
Justice 12, U.N. Doc. A/8238 (1970).
108. The term "Third World" originated from the French term tiers monde.
This term was popularized in France between 1947 and 1949 to describe a group
of splinter parties who stood midway politically between DeGaulle's R.P.F. party

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol5/iss2/14

22

Slomanson: I.C.J. Damages: Tort Remedy for Failure to Punish or Extradite In
1974

I.C.J.

DAMAGES

the political motivation defense in cases involving murder and
some other forms of terrorism. Applicable judicial standards
would not accommodate this adherence as evidenced by article
6, which dictates that judicial election shall represent the main
forms of civilization and principal legal systems of the world. 10 9
Western legal principles, which abhor conduct such as the murder
of thirty-two innocent travelers which occurred in the Munich
disaster, 110 do not balance with the fact that the responsible Palestinian terrorists were never punished."' The United Nations inability to implement immediate measures for preventing international terrorism subsequent to the Munich disaster' 1 2 is a clear
indication that such perspectives as those of the Middle East and
Africa may justify conduct that is reprehensible in the Western
Hemisphere. This variance in philosophies cannot be ignored
since:
The general body of states has . . . no machinery

. . .

which

allows a majority to cultivate a dissentient minority and to
pass measures into law which will then become binding on all,
x3
whether they have agreed or not."
(Rally of the French People) and the Fourth Republic which it opposed. When
De Gaulle came to power he used the expression on many occasions to define
the position which he felt France should play in world politics as a non-aligned
State between the polarised ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union.
He felt that France should remain non-aligned and should thus be a tiers monde
between the two great World Powers.
Gradually the expression Third World has come to mean a grouping of nations who believe that by their very numbers, with particular emphasis in the
United Nations, they can make themselves into a third force capable of resisting
the might of the great powers. Since almost all of these non-aligned nations are
under-developed countries, the expression Third World is now used almost synonymously with underdeveloped nation. See Memorandum from Dr. Marcus Grantham, Lecturer in Law at California Western School of Law, Sept. 5, 1974, on file
with CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.
109. See DRAFT I.C.C. STATUTE, supra note 101, art. 6. The 1951 U.N. Draft
I.C.C. Statute bore nearly identical wording. See 1951 DRAFT I.C.C. STATUTE,
supra note 92, art. 10.
110. See, e.g., U.S. demand that these terrorists must be brought to trial so
that appropriate justice would be done. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1973, at 1, col.
2.
111. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1973, at 6, col. 1.
112. See text accompanying notes 7, 8, and 65-75, supra.
113. BRIERLY, OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1944). National legislative bodies are frequently prevented from taking action due to political paralysis rather than lack of legislative power under a constitution. The U.N.'s lack
of ability to act as an institution is often based upon lack of constitutional authorization to act other than by vote of nations. Compare U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1
with U.N. CHARTER, art. 18, paras. 2 & 3.
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Therefore, since the political probability is that no judge would be
elected from the significant minority of nations that do not identify
the perpetrators as international criminals,' 1 4 these nations would
not ratify the Draft I.C.C. Statute if the decision turned upon the
basis of representation since:
Judges shall be elected by an absolute majority of votes of
the States Parties at a meeting of representatives of the States
Parties to be convened . . .by the Secretary General of the
United Nations. 115
Article 17 suggests another potential problem. The Court
and its subsidiary organs may sit and exercise judicial functions at
places other -than the permanent seat. 116 Therefore, subsidiary
organs such as the Commission of Inquiry, Commission of Prosecution, or Board of Clemancy and Parole could operate in different
areas which vary greatly in competence and ideology. Potential
subchambers of the I.C.C. could develop which might result in
inquiries, prosecutions, and clemancy standards at odds with procedure at the permanent seat. This could diversify the application of customary international legal standards from region to region. A somewhat federalized conglomerate of subsidiary organs
would not nourish -the needed universal international legal norms.
Hopefully, this problem is one of conjecture, and the implementation of article 17 would result only in the designed objective of
flexibility for an I.C.C.
Another procedural problem involves article 22.11 It provides that "The Court shall be competent to judge persons
whether or not they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
The condition precedent to
officials or private individuals.""
trial proceedings is the conferring of jurisdiction by ,the individual's State, the State where the alleged crime was committed, or
the custodial State." 9 Assuming that Italy were to seek indictment of the Sheik of Kuwait as an accessory-after-the-fact for failure
to punish or extradite terrorists, 20 it would be impossible to con114. See generally African Mideast Draft Resolution, supra note 49.
115. DRAFT I.C.C. STATUTE, supra note 101, art. 5, para. 4 (emphasis added).
116. The 1951 U.N. Draft I.C.C. Statute was quite similar, although it was
not as specific as to the mobility of the Court's organs. See 1951 DRAFT I.C.C
STATUTE, supra note 92, art. 21.

117. DRAFT I.C.C. STATUTE, supra note 101, art. 22.
118. Id.
119. Id., art. 24.
120. See text accompanying notes 1-4, supra.
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fer jurisdiction based upon -the "obligation to search for and detain persons alleged to have committed any offense to which this
Convention applies.' 121 Italy would not have standing, in accordance with article 24,122 to either unilaterally assume jurisdiction

of the Sheik or establish I.C.C. jurisdiction absent Kuwait's consent. Thus a procedural stalemate arises.
A fourth problem involves the fact that trial by jury and apObpeal 'are basic tenets of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
jections to the United Nations draft statutes, 123 based upon the
,threat ,to these typical constitutional rights, may be appropriately
voiced in reference to the 1973 F.E.I.C.C. draft statute which denies these "rights" to the accused.' 2 4 A government will not be
a Party -to an 'agreement that would be unconstitutional if inter-

nally applied to its own citizens.
In addition to these statutory objections to a transnational
criminal forum, several legitimate State interests must be accom-

acceptance of this remedy for conmodated prior 'to foreseeable
12
trolling international crimes. 1
Some nations might take a dim view toward a potential executive or enforcement organ for the proposed I.C.C. In 1971, the

121. DRAFT CRIME CONVENTION, supra note 101, art. 6, para. 2. Another
procedural barrier would involve the nonapplicability of this obligation if the appropriate Party or Parties were to ratify only the I.C.C. Statute. A State might
identify with this transnational court remedy, yet be unwilling to ever concede
jurisdiction in any case of hijacking or political kidnapping that it clandestinely
supports. Even if such a State did ratify the Draft Crime Convention, it would
not be obligated to assent to jurisdiction of the I.C.C. in accordance with article
24 of the Draft I.C.C. Statute.
122. See text accompanying note 119, supra.
123. See, e.g., Finch, supra note 93.
124. The 1951 draft articles 37 and 50 precluded the right to trial by jury
and the right to appeal. See 1951 DRAFT I.C.C. STATUTE, supra note 92. The
recent draft I.C.C. statute has the specific article on trial by jury, but by negative
implication of article 34 (Rights of the Accused), this prerogative is unavailable
to the accused. Article 45 of this statute specifically denies the right of appeal,
although the subsidiary Board of Clemancy and Parole might practically achieve
what is technically nonexistent since "The judgment shall be final and without
appeal." See DRAFT I.C.C. STATUTE, supra note 101, art. 50.
125. See Connally Amendment, supra note 86, and text accompanying notes
118-124, supra. Further objections, in relation to war crimes which are beyond
the scope of this Article, would emanate from nations that might not align with
the concept of the Nuremberg Trials. Fundamental information about the world's
first international criminal assizes can be obtained from R. JACKSON, THE NuREMMr. Jackson was Chief Prosecuting Counsel for the United
BERG CASE (1971).
States and involved in trying Nazi leaders for the international or universal crime
of genocide.
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International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) 12 6 was invited
by the United Nations to cooperate in the elimination of the international crime of slavery. 2 7 However, Interpol was barred from
involvement in United Nations efforts to combat international

crimes involving terrorism.

28

National concern with sharing

crime-fighting duties was apparently outweighed by fears that Interpol, an essentially European organization, would consider as

criminal conduct what some African or Middle East nations might
consider to be political conduct. 2 9
Another State interest would be threatened by -the probable
computer invasion of privacy that would be nurtured by international law enforcement. The zeal for eradicating the terrorist menace would facilitate exposure of clandestine national support. This
could be embarrasing and dangerous. Political blackmail could
result from threatened exposure of secret records and other infor-

mation if an I.C.C.'s enforcement organ were able to use international resources to compile appropriate dossiers 3 ' involving con-

duct not considered criminal by all nations. As required by its
constitution, Interpol has always refrained from investigating political questions and conduct."'1 Since many countries view terrorism as political, this helps explain recent U.N. consideration and

rejection of Interpol for fighting international terrorism. 182 Concern. at -the recent U.N. meeting focused upon fears that an
126. The history, organization, and present activities of Interpol can be as-

certained in M.

FOONER, INTERPOL

(1973).

127. See Report of the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1070, E/CN.4/Sub.2/323 (1971).
128. See generally N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1972, at 19, col. 1.
129. See text accompanying notes 55-65, supra. The U.S. made terrorism a
major issue at the Interpol General Assembly, which met at Frankfurt, Germany
in 1972. The U.S. sought the help of Interpol to fight international terrorists.
The organization resolved to utilize its machinery to prevent and suppress terrorist
activity. See President Nixon Establishes Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, 67 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 475, 479 (1972).
130. Interpol has provided studies, dossiers, and other terrorist-fighting information to international organizations with which it maintains special relationships-the International Civil Aviation Organization, the United Nations General
Assembly, and the International Air Transport Association. These organizations
have access to their own national police agencies, so that coordinated efforts
against hijackers are now possible. See FOONER, supra note 126, at 29-30.
131. Art. 4 of the Interpol Constitution provides for membership of official
police bodies only if their activities are not political, including espionage and
counter espionage. Id., at 30.
132. See text accompanying notes 126-129, supra.
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executive subsidiary of an I.C.C. would face the possibility of a
takeover by a nation or bloc. Such a takeover by a particular nation or bloc may result in the use of classified documents for political blackmail or other terrorist purposes.13 3 It is quite simple
to overlook the existing reality -that national and individual seclusion -are no longer immune from the possibility of unwarranted intrusion insofar as the United Nations International Computing Cen34
tre functions in Geneva.1
In spite of the objections to an I.C.C., one must not lose sight
of the grim reality that multilateral inability to agree upon immediate measures to prevent terrorism has resulted in one of the
most objectionable impasses in United Nations history. The same
conduct that constitutes either an international delict 135 or an act
of brotherhood and bravery 36 surely signals the need for 'an international judiciary in order to avoid skirting the thin line of demarcation between peacetime -terrorism and international war. Notwithstanding national sovereignty objections, "teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsid133. Eastern bloc nations have been shadowed by the Western bloc in the
Security Council and General Assembly. The machinery of the U.N. is directed
at studying the right of self-determination and causes of international terrorism,
rather than implementing preventative measures. See text accompanying notes
65-75, supra. Now that the African-Eastern bloc has placed the shoe on the other
foot, Western nations may similarly fear forceful takeover or political domination
of an international information network under the auspices of Interpol or any
potential enforcement arm of an I.C.C. However, the U.S. recently lauded Interpol's participation in discouraging the international terrorist. See Address by
Lewis Hoffacker, U.S. Coordinator for Combating Terrorism, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: A Global Approach, 70 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL.
274, 276 (1974).
134. See Report of the Secretary General on Electronic Data Processing and
Information Systems in the United Nations Family of Organizations, U.N. Doc.
A/C.5/1475 (1972).
See also Report of the Secretary General on Coordination
and Integration of International Statistical Programmer, U.N. Doc. E/CN.3/422
(1972).
135. U.S. President Nixon stated, in response to the Palestinian terrorist murder of thirty-two airport passengers in Italy:
[Tlerrorists must be made to understand that senseless violence against
innocent bystanders, including helpless women and children in this instance, will not be tolerated by people and governments who wish to live
in peace within the law.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1973, at 18, col. 8.
136. One of the terrorists involved in the murder and hijacking in the RomeAthens-Kuwait incident stated upon "surrender" in Kuwait:
[W]e consider ourselves on a visit to an Arab country which is friendly
and a brother country. We are sure we will be accorded proper treatment and we are proud of Kuwait's support for the Palestinian cause.
Id., col. 5.
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iary means for the determination of rules of law,"13 7 have recently
reiterated that:
It is recommended once again that such a court [I.C.C.] be
established with jurisdiction over international crimes and in
particular over acts falling within the definition of terrorism.

138

Crimes such as hijacking and kidnapping of diplomats are
closely related to the transportation revolution in which the Twentieth Century now finds itself. Modern technology and its impact
on mobility between nations dictates that control of such offenses
is possible only through the combined efforts of the international
community.' 39 Although a World Criminal Court constitutes an
academic 140 alternative to classical concepts of territorial jurisdiction and extradition:
A World Criminal Court is absolutely necessary if we are to
think seriously of establishing a long lasting peace in the
world. This necessity becomes more obvious every day as we
witness conflicts and wars between states, even though they
41
are not officially declared as such.1
Terrorism may easily escalate into war. Establishment of an
I.C.C. would mitigate the future use of peacetime tactics designed
to export what is essentially an internal or domestic conflict.' 4 2
137. The operation of I.C.J. Statute provides that the Court's deliberation of
an international law dispute shall include application of the teachings of prominent individuals as a subsidiary source of international legal principles. See I.C.J.
STAT., art. 38, para. l(d).
138. Final Document of the International Conference on Terrorism and Political Crimes, at 10 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1973). The Conference advocated creation of an I.C.C. The proceedings will be published in 1974.
139. See FEICC, REPORT ON THE FIRST AND SECOND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONFERENCES, at 8 (Racine, Wis. 1973).
140. This author forwarded a general questionnaire, regarding a U.N. multilaterally established I.C.C., to fifty-four international legal scholars, jurists, criminal scientists, and U.N. diplomats. The twenty-one responses included six indications that an I.C.C. was a viable alternative; two others indicated "not at
present;" two responses were "part viable, part academic." Eleven responses signified the academic nature of this possible remedy.
141. Letter from Georges Sliwowski, Associate Dean, International Institute
of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, Siracusa, Italy, to this author dated Jan.
22, 1974.
142. For example, fifteen explosive devices were found in London department
stores and mail in a new campaign by sympathizers of the Irish Republican Army.
See N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1972, at 4, col. 4. The left hand of a British Embassy
(Wash.) secretary was blown up when she opened the morning mail. The letfer
bomb was similar to thirty such devices dispatched in London during the previous
week. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
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Before this universal recognition of a World Court is feasible, an
interim device must be implemented that is simpler than the I.C.C.
remedy, and is not as restrained by national sovereignty objections.
III.

CIVIL ANTIDOTE

WITHIN AN EXISTING MOLD

Alterius v. Botania

A.

Ideological and political differences must be subordinated to
-the interlocking needs of diverse nations, uniformly pursuing
"the goal of perfecting judicial machinery to replace the instruments of war."' 43 This goal provided the inspiration for the 1973
World Peace Through Law Conference convened at Abidjan, Ivory
Coast.
The Draft Report of the Committee of Experts on Expanding
the Jurisdiction of the I.C.J. reasoned that:
Recent history ,has shown that political differences among the
major powers move towards resolution when the advantages
of cooperation . . .clearly outweigh the restricting force of
144

ideological differences.
The 123-nation conference resolved that States reluctant to consent
to compulsory jurisdiction of the Court may nevertheless consent to
Another
jurisdiction in matters devoid of political sensitivity. 14
Conference resolution advocates amendment of -the United Nations Charter to require all Members to submit international dis1 46
putes for mandatory settlement.
DRAFT I.C.J. EXPANSION REPORT, supra note 107, at 8.
144. Id., at 5.
145. See WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW CENTER, THE CHALLENGE OF ABIDJAN

143.

AND

RESOLUTIONS

ADOPTED BY

THE ABIDJAN

WORLD CONFERENCE ON

WORLD

PEACE THROUGH LAW, Res. 5, at 7 (Wash. 1973) [hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE
OF ABIDJAN]. The work of the Conference, including the demonstration Skyjacking Trial, is summarized in Allen, World Peace Through Law Center Holds Tenth
Anniversary Conference in Ivory Coast, 59 A.B.A.J. 1289 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Tenth Anniversary Conference]. The trial proceedings will be officially
published when all decisions have been submitted to the World Peace Through
Law Center. Letter from Charles S. Rhyne, President, World Peace Through Law
Center, to this author, dated Feb. 15, 1974.
146. See CHALLENGE OF ABIDJAN, supra note 145, Res. 19, at 16 (emphasis
added). This resolution is generally geared toward the outlawing of war. Its
implication could include submission of disputes to the U.N.'s judicial organ recognizing, inter alia, that world habeas corpus and redress to a universal court of
human rights, when the self-determination is allegedly suppressed, would alleviate
some of the tensions that motivate terrorists to act. Regarding habeas corpus
and redress to a human rights court, see CHALLENGE OF ABIDJAN, supra note 145,
Res. 17, at 15.
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This ideological commitment to expanded I.C.J. jurisdiction
for settlement of disputes provided the background for the moot
court trial of Republic of Alterius v. Democratic State of Botan-

ia.'47 Francisco Xaviere, a citizen of Alterius, hijacked a local airliner. He forced it to land in Botania, seeking asylum and publicity
for the cause of his people.

Robert Yellman, a passenger from a

third nation identified as the Coronado Republic, was killed while
attempting to disarm Xaviere. Botania conducted a preliminary
hearing but declined to punish or extradite Xaviere. 14 8 Alterius
brought an action against Botania and Xaviere in the "I.C.J." for
extradition. Coronado sought damages for the wrongful death of
Yellman. Botania, a member of the United Nations and Party to
the I.C.J. Statute, 149 procedurally defended and lost on the basis
of lack of jurisdiction to entertain these claims.' 5 ' Xaviere's article 34(1)"' defense 52 was successful.153 However, Botania was
54
ordered to extradite him. 1
The thrust of the case centered upon Botania's two primary
defenses. First, Botania contended that the hijacking constituted
147. This demonstration trial was initially scheduled for argument as a criminal trial at the 1971 World Peace Through Law Center Conference in Yugoslavia. See Rhyne, Foreword to THE BELGRADE SPACESHIP TRIAL, at 2 (B. Segal
ed. 1972). Presentation was rescheduled for the 1973 Conference. The proceedings were civil rather than criminal in nature, being heard before a hypothetical
I.C.J. composed of leading world jurists. The attendance included chief justices
or high court justices from ninety-six nations and ministers of justice, attorneys
general, or bar president from fifty-one nations. See Tenth Anniversary Conference, supra note 145, at 1291.

148. This imaginary situation was well conceived in view of Kuwait's factual
failure to punish or extradite the Palestinian terrorists who killed thirty-two airport travellers and took hostages pursuant to an attack on a U.S. airliner in Rome.
See text accompanying notes 1-4, supra. Both the imaginary nation of Botania and
the real world nation of Kuwait exhonerated terrorists as political refugees.
149. The real world nation of Kuwait shares this same status.
150. Statement of Facts in Issue in explanatory statement by Tafari Berhane
of Ethiopia, Chairman, Demonstration Trial, Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Aug. 28, 1973.
151. The International Court of Justice Statute dictates that "Only states may
be parties in cases before the Court." I.C.J. STAT., art. 34, para. I (emphasis
added).
152. See Brief for Defendant at 2, Republic of Alterius v. Democratic State
of Botania, Demonstration "I.C.J." Trial (Abidjan 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Individual Defendant].
153. The "holding" of the "I.C.J." was silent as to this defense. However,
Alterius' claim for extradition was granted, thereby achieving a similar result due
to Botania's adjudicated responsibility to extradite. See Tenth Anniversary Conference, supra note 145, at 1293.

154. Id.
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a political offense. 155 This defense allegedly qualified Xaviere for
political asylym 156 and rendered the Court incompetent to assume

jurisdiction over a political question.' 57 Alterius countered with
'the argument that "[a]cts of aerial hijacking cannot in themselves
' 58
be political acts, that is, directed against a sovereign alone."'
Coronado submitted that the:
[I]njurious results of a denial of justice are not necessarily
confined to the individual victim or his family, but include
such consequences to the victim's country as the mistrust and
lack of safety felt by it [and] other nationals similarly
situated."59

Coronado asserted -that all States must prosecute such criminals
to safeguard 'the interests of their own nationals as well as to prevent crimes against international law.' 60 Therefore, Botania's failure to apprehend and punish Xaviere was viewed as direct complicity with the murderer.
Secondly, Botania defended by arguing that there was no
In other words, exquestion of international law presented.'
tradition is a legal question purely within the domestic jurisdiction
of every State.' 62 Therefore, neither a United Nations Resolu155. See Brief for Defendant at 8, Republic of Alterius v. Democratic State
of Botania, Demonstration "I.C.J." Trial (Abidjan 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Botania].
156. Id., at 11. Botania relied upon the U.S. position that:
States generally refuse to enforce in their territory the criminal law of

another state and to surrender fugitives from the criminal jurisdiction
of another state, except as they may have committed themselves to do
so by international agreement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

§ 9, comment e, at 27 (1965).
157. Some nation's Supreme Judiciaries avoid involvement in political affairs
of State by declining to hear "political questions." See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962).
Neither the U.N. Charter nor I.C.J. Statute specifically prohibit determination of a political question. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 96 and
I.C.J. STAT., arts. 36 & 65, referring to legal questions. The Abidjan Resolution
on Expanding the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice proposes a
statutory amendment "to entertain claims . . . in subjects of limited political
sensitivity." See CHALLENGE OF ABIDJAN, supra note 145, Res. 5, at 7.
158. See Brief for Plaintiff at 11, Republic of Alterius v. Democratic State
of Botania, Demonstration "I.C.J." Trial (Abidjan 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Alterius].
159. See Coronado's Brief for Plaintiff, at 2, Republic of Alterius v. Democratic State of Botania, Demonstration "I.C.J." Trial (Abidjan 1973).
160. Id., at 5.
161. Brief for Botania, supra note 155, at 5.
162. Id., at 6-7.
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condemning hijacking

would create a rule of customary international law which would
bind Botania. 165
Chief Justice Elias of Nigeria delivered the opinion of the
Court, holding that "Only the I.C.J. has the power to decide . . .

whether or not it has jurisdiction ...

. 16

He continued writing

that no one state "can unilaterally characterize 'an offense as 'political';"'1 6 7 that hijacking is an international crime triable in either a
municipal or international forum; 168 and that Member States, as
well as nonmember States of the United Nations, are bound by resolutions of the General Assembly regarding fundamental issues, including ithis form of international terrorism.' 6 9

This holding, if in fact evidence of peremptory norms of international law from which States cannot derogate, 17 foreshadows
a civil antidote for international terrorism. The existing I.C.J.
could provide the mold for an approach which would be currently more acceptable -than a criminal court. Utilizing the exist163. Id., at 8.
164. See Brief for Botania, supra note 155, at 8.
165. Id., at 10.
166. See Tenth Anniversary Conference, supra note 145, para. l(d) at 1293.
This holding was based upon the statutory provision that "[i]n the event of a
dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by
the decision of the Court." I.C.J. STAT., art. 38, para. 6.
167. See Tenth Anniversary Conference, supra note 145, para. l(a) at 1293.
This result was based upon a 1950 I.C.J. case holding that the Court has jurisdiction in extradition cases and that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant nations can
unilaterally attach political characterizations to actionable conduct. See Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. 266.
168. See Tenth Anniversary Conference, supra note 145, at 1293. The import of a holding lies in the Court's determination that this form of terrorism
is an international crime which constitutes a preemptory norm of general international law.
169. Although Botania contended that it was not bound by U.N. General Assembly resolutions against hijacking, the Court applied the Namibia Case, involving self-determination, by analogy to this hypothetical case. The former held that
U.N. General Assembly resolutions bind member and nonmember States on certain fundamental issues such as the right of self-determination. See Advisory
Opinion on the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, [1971] I.C.J.
Rep. 16.
170. Such a norm is defined as:
[A] norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, open for signature May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, art. 53 (1969), 63 AM. J. INT'L L., at 891 (1969)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention on Treaties].
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ing statute of ,the International Court of Justice could lead to a soto
lution to the United Nations discord 7 ' exemplified by 1failure
72
murders.
and
violence
Rome-Athens-Kuwait
the
resolve
B.

InternationalTort: A Proposal

Membership in the United Nations endows a nation with ipso
facto membership to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 17 However, competence of the Court may ,be qualified by a
reservation 1 74 limiting compulsory jurisdiction in regard to
breaches of international obligations or the nature and extent of
reparation. 75 The Court cannot adjudicate personal injury,
wrongful death, or property damage by and between persons and
corporations from different countries.' 76 It cannot adjudicate
criminal aotions against individuals. 77 Therefore, terrorists, as
individuals, continue to circulate with immunity from the injunctive remedy of extradition ordered by the mock I.C.J. in Republic
of Alterius v. Democratic State of Botania. 78 Enlarging I.C.J.
jurisdiction to permit extradition of an individual would require
all permanent Members of the Security Council, and a two-thirds
majority of the General Assembly,17 9 to amend the United Nations
Charter.
Present attempts to frame a remedy for international terrorism need not begin with the labyrinthe of statutory amendments
necessary for creating jurisdictional machinery to ,try terrorists as
individuals. 8 0 The United Nations Charter affirms this principle:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
171. See text accompanying notes 46-75, supra.
172. See text accompanying notes 1-4, supra.
173. U.N. CHARTER, art. 93, para. 1.
174. See Connally Amendment, supra note 86.
175. I.C.J. STAT., art. 36, para. 2.
176. See note 151, supra.
177. Id.
178. Demonstration "I.C.J." Trial, Abidjan, Ivory Coast (1973), supra note
147. See also text accompanying notes 147-54, supra.
179. U.N. CHARTER, art. 108. Two-thirds of the members of the General
Assembly, including all permanent members of the Security Council, must ratify
amendments to the Charter. This procedure applies also to the I.C.J. Statute
which is an integral part of the Charter. Id., art. 92.
180. The present I.C.J. is competent only in disputes between nation States.
I.C.J. STAT., art. 34, para. 1. The existing Statute does not provide for appeal.
I.CJ. STAT., art. 60. It is probable that national jurisprudence rooted in AngloAmerican or European civil law would be considerably threatened by prospects
of criminal proceedings without appeal.
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within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present charter .... 181

Substantive provisions of municipal law, linked to the territorial and protective principles of international criminal jurisdiction,1 2 are not designed to correlate with the jurisdiction of a
transnational forum. For example, if a United States citizen of
Jewish extraction was inclined to kidnap an Arab diplomat in
Washington, D.C., it would be difficult -to imagine United States

extradition to an international court. This act would constitute a
generally defined international crime; 1 3 but the possibility of an
Interpol transfer to a European jail"8 4 pending World Criminal
Court proceedings cannot be seriously considered until the world

community has a satisfactory interim civil device facilitating enforcement of justified claims.
A three-step process is necessary to facilitate the use of the
proposed international tort for failure to punish or extradite in-

ternational terrorists.

This process should supplement U.N. and

national solutions -to the causes of terrorism.
1. Expanding the Definition of International Terrorism,
85
Not the Scope of the I.C.J.-Current efforts to curb terrorism'
181.
182.
183.
note 74;

U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7.
See generally note 20, supra.
See generally "Internationally Protected Persons" Draft Articles, supra
FEICC, REPORT ON THE FIRST AND SECOND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW CONFERENCES, supra note 100; DRAFT I.C.J. EXPANSION REPORT, supra note
107; CHALLENGE OF ABIDJAN, supra note 145, Res. 20, at 16.
184. Regarding the role of an international criminal police force attached to
a World Criminal Court, see Nepote, The Role of an International Criminal Police in the Context of an International Criminal Court and Police Cooperation
with Respect to International Crimes, in 1 M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 676 (1973). There are 111 Member nations
in Interpol with a roster that ranges from Algeria to Zambia, including the U.S.
See FOONER, supra note 126, at 33. However, excessive attachment to national
sovereignty over criminal individuals constitutes the major barrier to Interpol's
ripening into a legitimate executive arm of a criminal court. Interpol's object is
to bypass protocol and formality when necessary to counter crime. This perspective allegedly impinges on national sovereignty. Id., at 42.
185. The Abidjan World Peace Through Law Conference resolved to expand
I.C.J. jurisdiction to include suits between individuals and corporations in the commercial trade arena. This could serve as a testing ground for States suing individuals on causes of actions related to terrorist conduct. The Foundation for establishing the World Criminal Court remedy seeks to change the existing statutory
structure of the I.C.J. or else develop a new statute for trying individuals. See
text accompanying notes 97-103, supra. Numerous criminal procedure provisions
would have to be negotiated and implemented.
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have repeatedly clashed with the existing framework of the I.C.J.
The concept of a separate criminal court or criminal subchamber
of the I.C.J. necessitates altering the Statute so that individuals
may be parties.' 8 6 The decision of the Skyjacking Trial 18 7 correctly held that the Court was competent to order extradition by
the hypothetical nation of Botania, but not direct extradition by
the Court itself. There is no real world basis for in personam ju88
risdiction in international law.1
If this problem is .to be remedied before terrorists are able
to hijack aerospace vehicles, concentration must focus upon expanding world-wide agreement as to the definition of international
terrorism. Surface or air piracy, kidnapping or murder of internationally protected persons, and any multilaterally defined exportation of terrorism rooted in domestic or regional conflict should
constitute universal crimes which all nations have a duty to prevent. It can no longer be asserted that this is not a "question
of international law;' 8 9 therefore, it falls within one of the jurisdictional bases enumerated in article 36 of the current I.C.J. Stat90
ute.1
The tough problem involves pressing claims against nations
who are unwilling defendants.'
It is very simple for them to
construe any conduct occurring within a nation's borders as being "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
.... ,"92 However, whether international terrorism may be
characterized as either a common crime against mankind or a politically justifiable act is a question of international, not municipal,
law. Therefore, a solution may lie in the contemporary I.C.J. deciding such jurisdictional disputes by resort to "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;' 93 and
"[t]he general principles of law recognized by civilized nations
"194

The next step in the process will have to be to link interna186. See note 151, supra.
187.
188.

See text accompanying note 154, supra.
See note 151, supra.

189. The Court may adjudicate disputes concerning "any question of international law." I.C.J. STAT., art. 36, para. 2(b).
190. See Brief for Botania, supra note 155, at 5.
191.

Most States Parties to the Statute have not opted to accept compulsory

jurisdiction of the Court. See, e.g., Connally Amendment, supra note 86.
192. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7.
193.

I.C.J. STAT., art. 38, para. 1(b).

194. Id., art. I(c).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1975

35

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1975], Art. 14
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 5

tional custom and general principles of international law with the
recognition that no one State can unilaterally characterize conduct
as political when innocent people are kidnapped, murdered, or otherwise harmed. Such unilateral characterization is damaging in
relations with countries that consider such terrorism a crime. As
international relations deteriorate, it becomes less advantageous to
grant asylum or other support to those who communicate their
political ills by utilizing fear to effect radical change. Tort liability for failure to punish or extradite perpetrators of the appropriate crimes' 95 is a logical result of multilateral recognition of the
obligation to adopt measures to prevent international terrorism.
2. Elements of the Tort.-Before -this tort can be multilaterally established, its elements must be defined and its scope refined. The prima facie case would include the duty to effectively 96 punish or extradite those who perpetrate acts of terror
which "cannot in themselves be political acts, that is, directed
against a sovereign alone."' 9 7
Breach of the duty to punish or extradite could result in the
causes of action listed in following illustration. Three Cuban guerillas seized a Greek ship in Pakistan on February 3, 1974, threatening to blow it up and kill their hostages.' 9 8 Greece released 'the
bargained-for Palestinian terrorists from local custody and the
Cubans flew from Pakistan -to Saudi Arabia.' 9 9 If the latter nation
fails to punish or extradite the Cubans and Palestinians, it would
breach a responsibility to the United Nations Membership requiring appropriate measures to prevent further acts of international
200
terrorism. Both Greece and Pakistan could sue for damages
195. See notes 9, supra & 206, infra.

196. See Brief for Botania, supra note 155, at 15. Botania defended its failure to extradite Xaviere by its convening of a preliminary hearing. The hijacker
was previously politically excused in accordance with Botania's internal law.

Therefore, Botania advocated that extradition would result in double jeopardy.
197.

See Brief for Alterius, supra note 158, at 11.

198. See L.A. Times, Feb. 4, 1974, at 1, col. 3. Greece had previously sentenced Palestinian terrorists to death for the machine gun-grenade attack in the

crowded transit lounge of Athens' International Airport which killed five and
wounded fifty-five. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 6. This was the
first known trial and scheduled execution sentence for international terrorists.
199.

See L.A. Times, Feb. 4, 1974, at 1, col. 3.

200. The "I.C.J." in the demonstration trial at Abidjan held that:
[F]ailure on the part of Botania to punish or extradite Xaviere [terrorist
hijacker] . . .engages its international responsibility, and it should make
adequate reparation to Alterius, the exact amount of which will be fixed

by this Court after the necessary particulars are made available to it
by a referee appointed by this Court.

See Tenth Anniversary Conference, supra note 145, at 1293.
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caused by Saudi Arabia's international tort.2 '

On these facts,

Pakistan could have the duty to sue since inaction would suggest
approval rather than forced submission to terrorist blackmail.

Universal jurisdiction 20 2 would constitute the appropriate basis for
I.C.J. competence in an international dispute based on this tort.
3. Establishing the Tort.-Disagreement exists as to what
constitutes an apolitical crime against mankind. However, fundamental differences on the issue of the political motivation defense
,to international murder, kidnapping, and hijacking is currently on
the decline. If Cuba and the United States can agree that polit-

icaly motivated hijacking terminating in either country is now
punishable or extraditable,2" 3 the prospect for multilateral consensus is far less academic. Furthermore, the nations of the U.N.

General Assembly recently adopted a Convention on the protection of diplomats without objection.2°4 These landmark negotiations are evidence, but not dispositive, of an international custom supporting the general principle that "terrorists"2 5 should be
punished or extradited. The political motivation defense should
be clearly disposed of, thereby ensuring a practical future for this
tort in I.C.J. case law.
A General Assembly resolution should recommend that its
Members establish the duty to punish or extradite, based upon the
mere presence of perpetrators of specific international terrorist
crimes. 20 6 This resolution would be evidence of a customary rule
201. At least twenty-eight terrorists surrendered to Arab governments in
1973, however, none have been brought to trial. See L.A. Times, Feb. 4, 1974,
at 1, col. 3.
202. See note 20, supra.
203. See text accompanying notes 21 & 22, supra.
204. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
3166 (XXVIII) (1973), 70 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 91 (1974).
205. See note 9, supra.
206. Such a resolution could draw upon the appropriate enumerated offenses
from the following documents: Convention for the Prevention and Punishment
of Terrorism, arts. 2, 3, L.O.N. Doc. C.546(l).M.383(l). 1937V (1937); Report
Adopted by the Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism,
L.O.N. Doc. C.222.M.162. 1937V (1937); O.A.S. Convention on Terrorism,
supra note 26; Study on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, supra
note 41, referring to the I.C.A.O. Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal Conventions regarding suppression of unlawful aircraft seizure; International Law
Commission's "Internationally Protected Persons" Draft Articles, supra note 74;
Cuba-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 21; U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty, supra note 23; and DRAFr I.C.J. ExPANSTON REPORT, supra
note 107.
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of international law, but would not constitute a peremptory norm
of general international law from which States could not derogate.2 0 7 The key issue will be whether this resolution could ipfluence an unwilling State to accept mandatory jurisdiction of the
I.C.J. when the defined "terrorism" occurs.
The United Nations Charter provides that:
Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions
shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace
and security .... 208
The proposed "recommendation" of the U.N. would not necessarily be binding upon all nations, but would be strong evidence of
customary law, once adopted by the requisite two-thirds majority.2 0 9 The proposed mandatory jurisdiction "resolution" should
be approved by all U.N. Members who wish to take advantage of
effective association with this foremost problem-solving institution.
Although a few nations adhere to the political motivation defense
to international terrorism, -they cannot continue indefinitely.
Power politics will result in economic or social pressure to conform. The I.C.J. Statute permits the Court to look to international
custom and general principles of law." l ° There is no justifiable
motivation that outweighs an innocent human's right to live and
travel under the protection afforded both nationals and aliens by
the law of nations. It is argued that "[e]veryone has the right to
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."2 1' 1
207. See Tenth Anniversary Conference, supra note 145, at 1293, and note
170, supra. The "holding" of the demonstration "I.C.J." at Abidjan advocated,
but overstated, that hijacking was an example of an international crime not subject
to the political motivation defense. Compare Tenth Anniversary Conference, supra note 145, para. 2 at 1293, with note 170, supra. This author shares the hopeful expectation that hijacking and other forms of international terrorism will rise
from the level of violations of customary international law to violations of jus
cogens.

208. U.N.

CHARTER, art.

18, para. 2.

209. Cf. Brief for Alterius, supra note 158, at 7. Alterius advocated that
a rule set forth in a treaty could bind a third State as a customary rule of international law. By analogy, this author urges that a widely supported General
Assembly resolution could define the proscribed conduct and establish a duty to
punish or extradite terrorists.
210. See notes 193 & 194, supra.
211. See Brief for Individual Defendant, supra note 152, at 12. The Defend.
ant drew this wording from the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. A/810, art. 14, para. 1 (1948).
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However, this human right2 12 cannot be asserted at the expense
of murder, kidnapping, hijacking, or other forms of terrorism
which jeopardize an individual's right to expect the inviolability of
his person.
Another premise may validate the resolution's binding effect even upon unwilling States. The 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties states that: "Nothing . . .precludes a rule
set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a
customary rule of international law, recognized as such."2 1 This
Convention recognizes that treaties can generate customary international law. By analogy, the mandatory jurisdiction resolution
could similarly constitute a customary rule if widely accepted.
United Nations Members should join in adoption of this recommendation in order to avoid the uncontrolled repercussions of
transnational terrorism. As stated by Professor Bassiouni, regarding piracy and air hijacking:
Offenses against the Law of Nations . . .by their very nature
affect the world community as a whole. [T]hey cannot fall
within the "political offense" exception because . . . -they are
in derogation of the laws of mankind in general and international criminal law in particular. [S]uch an exception
would 'be in itself violative of international law and disruptive
of world public order .... 214
Mandatory jurisdiction, when a nation fails to punish or extradite one accused of defined terrorist acts, is not very startling in
view of this basic proposition. Adoption of a tort theory of recovery will not solve the causes of terrorism nor immediately deter
the individual perpetrators. It will be one step closer to establishing an international duty to compensate the victims. If a State is
unwilling to punish or extradite the guilty party, it must indemnify
the recipient of his actions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This article focuses upon suggesting a civil procedural device
which might become a step toward an international criminal proc212. The Defendant's brief conveniently deleted the second paragraph of the
article which further states that "[t]his right may not be involved in the case
of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." Id., art. 14, para. 2. The
heart of the case centered upon the characterization of the hijacker's conduct as
political or common crime.
213. See Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 170.
214. Political Offenses Exception, supra note 5, at 241.
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ess for dealing with problems such as terrorism. Curing the local
problems which spawn the exportation of terrorism has not been
considered a condition precedent to seeking an interim method of
thwarting the terrorist cancer spreading throughout the world.
The underdeveloped nation, adverse to colonial regimes,
is
unable to establish its own political objectives through, internal
mechanisms. Consequently, terrorism is tolerated as a means of
communicating regional problems to the international community.
If these ills were cured, the symptoms would not manifest themselves in the form of terrorist activity. But they have not as yet
been cured. Thus a dilemma 'has arisen because the powerful nations of the world do not sympathize with the right of self-determination as a justification for politically motivated terrorism.
It may be argued that the terrorist's cause is more holy than
life itself, and that the international stalemate regarding cure does
not constitute a serious problem because deterence of such terrorism would be futile. But this proposition fails to recognize that
a concerted remedy against nations furnishing clandestine support
would result in mitigating the effect of terrorist activity emanating
from or within such nations. Supporting nations would thus be
forced to seek alternate, hopefully more peaceful, means of expression. Contemporary multilateral attempts to abort common or international crimes 'have failed, in part, due to reluctance to renounce support for national or regional liberation movements.
The current crisis regarding international terrorism has accentuated -the obligation of the world community to promptly cure
the ills of minority groups which motivate such conduct. Ironically, those who would criticize United Nations minimal action 215
tend to overlook "unofficial" 21 6 attempts which will fail to control
this escalating problem without U.N. support.
The United Nation's International Law Commission can assume the unique position of persuading the political minds of
its Member-nations to adopt both the proposed international tort
theory and mandatory I.C.J. jurisdiction. The country that adheres to an unpopular philosophy cannot avoid the foreseeable
political and economic consequences that emanate from support
215. See U.S. Veto, supra note 4, at 90.

216. Attempts to remedy international terrorism are in progress under the
auspices of the Foundation for the establishment of an International Criminal
Court, the

International Criminal Law

Commission,

and the World

Peace

Through Law Center.
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of terrorist politics. Legal and economic liability for damages
would suppress the covert support that has fostered overt terrorism and disrespect for fundamental rights of individuals and
sovereign nations. Terrorist acts threaten the
[E]xistence and operation of the international system founded
upon mutual respect for international law and the common
217
customs and traditions of the world's civilizations.
One man's terrorist can no longer be another man's hero.

217. See

CHALLENGE OF ABIDJAN,

supra note 145, Res. 20, at 16.
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